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Abstract
An accused, who is unable to follow the criminal proceedings against him/
her on account of mental illness or intellectual disability, could be found 
unfit to stand trial. Whether the individual is indeed unfit is determined 
by the fitness test employed in the particular jurisdiction. This article 
considers the fitness tests employed in South Africa and the United States 
of America and points out the similarities and differences between them. 
The threshold for fitness in both these jurisdictions is low, resulting in the 
majority of accused persons sent for fitness assessments being found fit 
to stand trial. Amongst these accused are persons with serious mental 
illness. The article considers the impact of such a low threshold test on 
the fit but mentally ill accused and considers a therapeutic response to 
this category of accused persons.
INTRODUCTION
An accused’s mental illness or intellectual disability could potentially 
render him/her unfit to stand trial. The question as to whether an accused 
is indeed fit to stand trial is ultimately decided by the court.1 The court is, 
however, guided in its finding by reports from mental health professionals 
who assessed the particular accused for his/her fitness to stand trial.2 The 
* LLB (UJ), LLM (UNISA), LLD (UNISA). Senior Lecturer:   Medical Law and Legal 
Research Methodology, Department of Criminal and Procedural Law, University of South 
Africa.  Admitted attorney of the High Court of South Africa. I would like to acknowledge 
the financial support received from the UNISA College of Law Research and Innovation 
Committee in support of this research. The opinions contained in this publication are those 
of the author and do not represent those of the UNISA College of Law.
1 Ronald Louw, ‘Principles of Criminal Law: Pathological and Non-pathological Criminal 
Incapacity’ in Sean Kaliski (ed), Psycholegal Assessment in South Africa (Oxford University 
Press 2006) 45. Also see Ettienne du Toit, Frederick J de Jager, Andrew Paizes, Andrew St 
Quinton Skeen and Steph E van der Merwe, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 
(Juta 2012) 13–5.
2 The court is guided by expert opinion, as it is not an expert in the field of psychiatry itself 
and will, in most instances, not deviate from the recommendations made by the psychiatrists 
and psychologists. See in general S v McBride 1979 (4) SA 313 (W). See Du Toit (n 1) 13–1, 
13–11. Also see S v Mabena 2007 (1) SACR 482 (SCA) para 16, where it was stated that 
‘“Mental illness” and “Mental defect” are morbid disorders that are not capable of being 
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purpose of the fitness assessment is to determine whether the accused 
satisfies the test for fitness as it applies in that particular jurisdiction.3 
The majority of accused persons sent for fitness assessments in South 
Africa and the United States of America are found fit to stand trial.4 Among 
these are persons with serious mental illnesses. Once the accused is found 
fit to stand trial, no further consideration is given to the possibility that 
mental illness may be present, unless the accused raises the insanity defence. 
This fit but mentally ill accused is often left in the criminal justice system 
with inadequate mental health support. 
This article briefly outlines the core principle of fitness to stand trial. It 
explores and compares the test for fitness as it applies to South Africa and 
the United States of America. It focuses on the level of functioning required 
of the accused to be found fit to stand trial. This contribution suggests that 
the low threshold for fitness, in terms of the fitness tests, is the reason why 
large numbers of accused persons, including those with serious mental 
illnesses, are being found fit to stand trial. The article concludes by 
promoting a therapeutic response to the fit but mentally ill accused. 
THE PRINCIPLE OF FITNESS TO STAND TRIAL
It is a fundamental principle of South African law that an accused must be 
present at his/her trial.5 The same applies to the United States of America.6 
 diagnosed by a lay court without the guidance of expert psychiatric evidence. An inquiry into 
the mental state of an accused person that is embarked upon without such guidance is bound 
to be directionless and futile’.
3 In South Africa, the court orders an assessment on a J138 form that explains that the particular 
accused must be assessed by the appointed mental health professionals to determine whether 
the accused lacks the ability – due to mental illness or mental defect – to follow the criminal 
proceedings against him/her so as to conduct a proper defence. This is in line with the test 
for fitness as set out in s 77 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
4 See Tiaan Schutte, ‘“Single” versus “Panel” Appointed Forensic Mental Observations: Is 
the Referral Process Ethically Justifiable?’ (2013) 6 South African Journal of Bioethics and 
Law 64 at 67, for the position in South Africa. See Christopher Slobogin, Arti Rai and Ralph 
Reisner, Law and the Mental Health System, Civil and Criminal Aspects (5 edn, Thomson 
West 2009) 1020, who explain that most of the accused sent for fitness assessments in the 
USA are found fit to stand trial. Also see William Governsmith and Kevin Robinson, ‘Fitness 
to Stand Trial Evaluation Challenges in the United States: Some Comparisons with South 
Africa’ 2017 (47) South African Journal of Psychology 148 at 150, where this is confirmed. 
5 Section 35(3)(e) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 gives every arrested 
person the right to be present when he is tried. Section 158 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
51 of 1977. Also see Geert Stevens, ‘Re-establishing Triability by Means of Psychotropic 
Medication: An Analysis’ (2013) 76 THRHR 252 at 252. See further Albert Kruger Heimstra 
Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses (7 edn, LexisNexis 2010) 227. Also see Du Toit (n 1) 13–1. Also 
see Johan Snyman ‘The Declaration of a Patient as a State President’s Patient’ (1988) Acta 
Juridica 128 at 128.
6 See the position in New York as explained by LK Marks, Robert Dean, Mark Dwyer, Anthony 
Girese and James Yates, New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure (2 edn, Thomson West 2007) 
540.
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This presence infers both physical and psychological/mental presence.7 The 
psychological/mental presence refers to the accused’s ability to follow the 
proceedings and give instructions to his/her legal representative. 
Fitness to stand trial refers to the current mental capacity or the ability of 
an accused to understand the proceedings at the time when the trial is 
underway8 and is not concerned with the mental state of the accused 
retrospectively.9 The inquiry into a person’s fitness to stand trial has no 
bearing on the inquiry into whether or not the accused should be held 
accountable for the act committed.10 The capacities that are relevant within 
the assessment for triability (on the one hand), and criminal responsibility 
(on the other), are vastly different.11 It follows that non-triability does not 
presuppose non-responsibility and vice versa.12 
7 For the South African position see Kruger (n 5) 225. Also see in general Snyman (n 5) 
128–168. See further Pachcourie v Additional Magistrate, Ladysmith 1978 (3) SA 986 (N) 
991A–H. Also see Fawzia Cassim, ‘The Accused Person’s Competency to Stand Trial – A 
Comparative Perspective’ (2004) 45 Codicillus 17 at 19, 22. See Stevens (n 5) 262, who 
confirms this. For the position in the USA see Ralph Slovenko, Psychiatry in Law / Law 
in Psychiatry (2 edn, Routledge 2009) 171. Also see Slobogin (n 4) 1005, 1006, where 
it is emphasised that the moral aspect of the fitness requirements underlies many of the 
substantive and procedural aspects pertaining to mentally ill accused persons and assists in 
preserving the dignity and integrity of the criminal justice system.
8 Sean Kaliski, M Borcherds and F Williams, ‘Defendants are Clueless – The 30-day 
Psychiatric Observation’ (1997) 87 SAMJ 1351 at 1354. Also see Adelene Africa, 
‘Psychological Evaluation of Mental State in Criminal Cases’ in Colin Tredoux, Don Foster, 
Alfred Allan, Andrea Cohen and Doug Wassenaar (eds), Psychology and Law (Juta 2005) 
387. See Albert Kruger, Mental Health Law in South Africa (Butterworths 1980) 164, and 
S v Mabena 2007 (1) SACR 482 (SCA) para 12, as well as De Vos v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development 2015 (1) SACR 18 (WCC) para 7, where it is stated that ‘The 
accused is suffering from a mental illness the effect of which is that he or she cannot be put 
on trial: section 77 – the “now” question. In the adjudication of this question, the condition 
of the accused when the conduct in question was committed is not considered’. Also see 
Anthony Pillay, ‘Could S v Pistorius Influence Reform in the Traditional Forensic Mental 
Health Evaluation Format?’ (2014) 44 South African Journal of Psychology 377 at 378.
9 Kruger (n 5) 221. This is in contrast with the test for criminal capacity, which does not test 
the current state of mind of the accused but is a retrospective test, looking at the state of mind 
of the accused at the time of commission of the alleged offence. Also see Anthony Pillay, 
‘Competency to Stand Trial and Criminal Responsibility Examinations: Are there Solutions 
to the Extensive Waiting List?’ (2014) 44 South African Journal of Psychology 48 at 50, 
where it is confirmed that the assessment for criminal capacity is a retrospective one.
10 Fitness thus stands separately from the inquiry into guilt. See A Africa, ‘Insanity and 
Diminished Capacity Before the Courts’ at 3 <https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/
view/17210882/insanitypdf#> accessed on 10 July 2018. 
11 Snyman (n 5) 153.
12 See, however, the findings of Kaliski (n 8) 1354, where all those in the study that were found 
unfit to stand trial, was also found to lack criminal capacity. Kruger (n 5) 222, states that the 
assessment for criminal capacity, which looks at the accused’s state of mind retrospectively, 
will in many instances, however, also answer the question pertaining to whether the accused 
is fit to stand trial. Note, however, that lack of criminal capacity does not presuppose lack of 
fitness to stand trial. Also see Pillay (n 9) 50.
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It is possible for an accused to suffer from a serious mental illness and 
still have the ability and capacity to understand court proceedings and give 
coherent instructions to his/her legal representative.13 Since the mere 
presence of mental illness does not presuppose unfitness,14 determining the 
current level of functioning of the particular accused is crucial to truly 
determine fitness to stand trial. The test employed to determine fitness to 
stand trial evaluates such level of functioning for purposes of fitness to 
stand trial. 
An accused that is, due to mental illness or intellectual disability, unfit to 
stand trial may not be tried for as long as he/she is deemed unfit.15 Due to 
the possibility of detention in a psychiatric facility (that could follow upon 
a finding of unfitness),16 and the inevitable impact that such detention may 
have on the accused’s liberty, it is essential for the fitness assessment to 
accurately identify those accused persons who are indeed unfit to stand 
trial. Ensuring that only those that are truly fit to stand trial face the trial 
proceedings contributes to the integrity of the criminal justice system and 
the delivery of justice to the accused and the community.
The test used to determine fitness to stand trial in South Africa is 
discussed below, followed by a discussion of the test employed in the USA. 
The requirements of the fitness test as it stands in these two jurisdictions 
will be compared later on in the article. 
13 Africa (n 8) 389. Persons found fit to stand trial include those with serious mental illnesses, 
such as schizophrenia and major depression, who do not always meet the criteria to be found 
unfit to stand trial. Also see Arthur Lurigio and Jessica Snowden, ‘Putting Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence into Practice: The Growth, Operations, and Effectiveness of Mental Health 
Courts’ (2009) 2 The Justice System Journal 196 at 198, who specifically mention that 
persons with serious mental illness do not always meet the incompetence to stand trial 
criteria and are, consequently, found fit to stand trial, found guilty and sent to prison. See also 
Slobogin (n 4) 1020, where various studies revealed that in approximately 30% of matters, 
those with serious mental illnesses sent for observation are found fit to stand trial. 
14 Africa (n 8) 389. Also see Kaliski (n 8) 1352. Also see Kruger (n 5) 220, who points out that 
the court may take the fact that a person is receiving treatment in a psychiatric institution 
(in terms of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002) into consideration when judging an 
accused’s fitness to stand trial. The author points out that it is indeed possible for a court to 
find that an accused is fit to stand trial, despite the fact that he/she is receiving mental health 
care treatment and rehabilitation services in terms of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002. 
Also see Kruger (n 8) 168, for the position prior to the Mental Health Care Act and where he 
indicates that an abnormality does not necessarily affect triability.
15 S v Mabena and Another 2007 (1) SACR 482 (SCA). Also see Du Toit (n 1) 13–3. Also 
see Kruger (n 8) 164, who confirms the principle that a person who cannot follow the 
proceedings cannot be tried. 
16 Section 77(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (as amended) provides for an accused 
who is found unfit to stand trial to be detained as a state patient in terms of the Mental Health 
Care Act 17 of 2002 until a judge in chambers orders his release. Such periods of detention 
could be for prolonged periods of time. The Criminal Procedure Act was recently amended 
by the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 4 of 2017 to allow the court to release an unfit 
accused conditionally and even unconditionally in certain circumstances.
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THE TEST FOR FITNESS TO STAND TRIAL IN SOUTH AFRICA
Introduction
The South African test for fitness to stand trial is set out in section 77(1) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. The criteria for fitness is inferred 
from the description of unfitness as set out in section 77(1), where it is stated 
that an accused will be unfit to stand trial if he/she, by reason of mental 
illness or intellectual disability,17 is not able to understand the proceedings 
in order to make a proper defence.18
An accused will only be deemed unfit to stand trial if it is established that 
the symptoms of the mental illness impair the functioning of the individual 
to such an extent that he/she is unable to understand the court proceedings 
and/or, the symptoms severely impair his/her capability to give proper 
instructions to his/her legal representative.19 Whether this is indeed the case 
is established through a court-ordered fitness assessment, during which the 
test for fitness is applied.20 
The identified assessment elements are discussed below.21 Even though 
the test entails two clearly defined elements, a common-sense approach to 
the determination of fitness to stand trial is promoted.22 
ABILITY TO FOLLOW THE PROCEEDINGS
This first element requires a general understanding of the court proceedings.23 
Exact knowledge and understanding of the technicalities of criminal 
procedural law are not required.24 Ignorance of the court procedures will not 
render an accused unfit to stand trial since ignorance can be supplemented 
with explanations and further knowledge.25 
17 The term ‘intellectual disability’ was introduced into the Criminal Procedure Act by the 
Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 4 of 2017. This term replaced the outdated term of 
‘mental defect’ as it appeared in ss 77, 78 and 79 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
18 Section 77(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act. Also see Du Toit (n 1) 282.
19 Africa (n 8) 389. Also see Pillay (n 9) 50.
20 The order is issued in terms of s 77(1) read with section 79(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act.
21 If an accused does not fulfil the requirements in terms of either of the elements, he/she will 
be deemed unfit to stand trial. 
22 Du Toit (n 1) 13–5. 
23 See Snyman (n 5) 133. Snyman points out that this position is in line with the Australian point 
of view and quotes from an Australian case, which sets out the concept of fitness to stand 
trial very eloquently: The supreme court in R v Presser [1958] VR 45 at 48, summarised it 
as follows: ‘He needs, I think, to be able to understand what it is that he is charged with. He 
needs to be able to plead to the charge and to exercise his right of challenge. He needs to 
understand generally the nature of the proceedings, namely that it is an inquiry as to whether 
he did what he is charged with. He needs to be able to follow the course of the proceedings so 
as to understand what is going on in court in a general sense, though he need not, of course, 
understand the purpose of all the various court formalities. He needs to be able to understand, 
I think, the substantial effect of any evidence that may be given against him; and he needs to 
be able to make his defence or answer to the charge’. 
24 Du Toit (n 1) 13–5.
25 Snyman (n 5) 132.
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As alluded to earlier, the mere presence of mental illness does not in 
itself render the person unfit to stand trial.26 Similarly, the mere fact that a 
person has an intellectual disability will not automatically render him/her 
unfit to stand trial.27 Triability of such an accused also depends on other 
factors, such as speech and language proficiency, reasoning ability and level 
of education. Opinion exists that once it is established that an individual’s 
language proficiency is acceptable and that he/she can reason, that person is 
considered competent to stand trial.28
It appears that only a total inability to follow the proceedings will render 
an accused unfit to stand trial under this leg of the fitness test.
The second part of the test focusses on the ability to conduct a proper 
defence, which entails being able to instruct one’s legal representative 
properly.
ABILITY TO CONDUCT A PROPER DEFENCE 
The ability to conduct a proper defence entails that the accused must be 
able to answer to the charges against him/her29 and must be able to convey 
relevant information to legal representatives in order for them to give advice 
thereon.30 The accused must be able to play a constructive role in the trial by 
giving instructions to the legal representative.31 The accused must be able to 
convey the facts upon which the defence relies to prove his/her innocence, 
and should also be able to evaluate all the evidence given at the trial.32 
The ability to give exact instructions on how the legal representative should 
conduct the defence is not required.33 An accused that simply lacks a defence 
26 Africa (n 8) 389. Also see Kaliski, Borcherds and Williams (n 8) 1352 where it is stated 
that the practice at the time (in the 1990s) was that most psychiatrists would indicate that 
an accused is unfit to stand trial where a mental illness or defect has been diagnosed as 
there were no clear guidelines on how the assessment for fitness to stand trial should be 
assessed. Also see Kruger (n 5) 220. Also see Kruger (n 8) 168, where he points out that an 
abnormality does not necessarily affect triability. See Pillay (n 9) 50, who explains that the 
diagnosis is not the most important aspect here but rather the symptoms and the functional 
implications of the symptoms.
27 FJW Calitz, PHJJ van Rensburg, PP de Jager, ML Olander, L Thomas, R Venter and GA 
Wessels, ‘Psychiatric Evaluation of Intellectually Disabled Offenders Referred to the Free-
State Psychiatric Complex, 1993–2003’ (2007) 13 SAJP 147–1520 at 148. 
28 Calitz (n 27) 148. They go even further and argue that the presence or absence of a mental 
illness or intellectual disability then becomes irrelevant. Also see Pillay (n 9) 50, who points 
out that the functional implications of the diagnosis of a mental illness is more important in 
the fitness context than the diagnosis itself. The mere presence of amnesia does not render an 
accused unfit to stand trial unless the amnesia is a symptom of a mental illness. The person 
will be unfit to stand trial due to mental illness and not amnesia per se. Snyman (n 5) 135. 
Also see this source at 128, 135, and the sources listed there, which includes foreign case law 
that supports this view.
29 Pillay (n 9) 50.
30 Snyman (n 5) 134.
31 Du Toit (n 1) 13–5.
32 Snyman (n 5) 253.
33 ibid 133.
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against a charge or has a bizarre defence, is not automatically unfit to stand 
trial,34 as long as the accused can instruct his/her legal representative on 
such defence.
Where an accused decides to conduct his/her own defence, the court has 
to be satisfied that the accused is indeed able to do so. The fact that someone 
might be acting against his/her own interests by conducting his own defence, 
does not in itself render him/her unfit to stand trial.35 
Some accused persons might find it difficult to communicate with their 
legal representatives due to a language barrier. For example, they might be 
communicating in a second language, which could result in a limited 
vocabulary. This is especially so if the level of education of the particular 
accused is low.36 
The accused’s physical condition could also potentially impact his/her 
ability to communicate with his/her legal representatives. Take, for instance, 
the position of a deaf-mute accused. Historically, a deaf-mute accused was 
simply found unfit to stand trial because of his/her inability to communicate,37 
regardless of the presence or absence of a mental illness or intellectual 
disability. This is fortunately no longer the case38 and it is accepted that the 
deaf-mute accused’s inability to communicate can be remedied by arranging 
34 ibid 134. Snyman also points out that the fact that someone is unfit to stand trial does not 
mean that he/she does not have a defence to the charge. 
35 ibid 134.
36 Africa (n 8) 392.
37 According to older legislation in South African law, a person who was unable to understand 
criminal proceedings for any reason fell under the jurisdiction of the Mental Disorders 
Act 38 of 1916. The implication of this was that a person who was not able to follow the 
proceedings, for any reason whatsoever (including being deaf-mute – see s 28 of the Mental 
Disorders Act 38 of 1016, regardless of whether a mental illness or defect was present, could 
be found unfit to stand trial and declared a State President’s Patient. Snyman (n 5) 136. Also 
see Kruger (n 5) at 229. Also see Kruger (n 8) 167, who explains that this result was due 
to the provisions of section 164 of the 1995 Criminal Procedure Act and section 28 of the 
Mental Disorders Act that had to be considered in conjunction with each other. The courts 
interpreted these sections to mean that a person could be declared a State President’s Patient 
merely on the ground that he/she is unable to follow the proceedings rather than a requirement 
that the relevant person must suffer from a mental illness or defect as a prerequisite for being 
declared a State President’s Patient. The rule that a deaf-mute person should be treated as 
mentally defective was laid down in the cases of S v Kansiyo 1930 SR 127 and S v Chinzenda 
1945 SAR 175. Also see Kruger (n 8) 167. In Roman-Dutch law, a deaf-mute person was 
not regarded as mentally ill. See S v Mamyila 1913 TPD 464. Also see Kruger (n 8) 166 note 
83, where reference is made to some older case law and sources where this position in the 
Roman-Dutch law is confirmed.
38 It was later agreed that there is no provision that states that a person that cannot be tried 
should be treated as insane. See In re Pupu 1959 (3) SA 480 (SR, B) 481H. Also see Du Toit 
(n 1) 167 
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for a translator, which would enable the person to meaningfully participate 
in conducting his/her defence.39
Communication barriers should be considered carefully before it is 
assumed that an accused is, on account of such barriers, unfit to stand trial.40 
This is especially important since the inability to communicate properly in 
order to instruct a legal representative is not necessarily an indication of or 
the result of mental illness.41 
Comments on the South African Test for Fitness
The mere fact that an accused is diagnosed with a mental illness or 
intellectual disability does not automatically render him/her unfit to stand 
trial under South African law. It has to be clear that the mental illness affects 
the accused ability to follow the court proceedings or to give instructions to 
legal representatives. The requirement for both elements of the test is very 
basic and does not demand a very high level of understanding or functioning.
In essence, if an inability to either understand the proceedings or give 
proper instructions to one’s legal representative can be remedied, such 
inability shall not render an accused unfit to stand trial.42 The position of the 
deaf-mute accused referred to above is an apt example. 
Even though an understanding of the court proceedings is required, there 
is no requirement for such understanding to be rational. The instructions to 
the legal representative need not be rational either, as it is clearly stated that 
a bizarre defence is not an indication of unfitness. 
It appears that an accused has to be severely affected by mental illness or 
intellectual disability to be found unfit to stand trial. A relatively low 
threshold is set for fitness to stand trial in South Africa. 
39 Kruger (n 8) 166. If all efforts are not made to interpret the proceedings for the deaf-mute 
person, this could constitute a violation of his right to a fair trial and could constitute unfair 
discrimination on the ground of disability in accordance with section 9 of the Constitution. 
In Pachcourie v Additional Magistrate, Ladysmith 1978 (3) SA 986 (N) 991H, it was stated 
that a deaf-mute person is not fit to stand trial if he is unassisted. Current legislation does not 
allow referral for a fitness assessment merely because someone is deaf-mute. It is only when 
the deaf-mute person suffers from a mental illness or mental defect that the deaf-mute person 
may be detained under the mental health care legislation as was the case in S v Matjhesa 1981 
(3) SA 854 (O). A deaf-mute accused or witness may make use of an interpreter who can 
convert sign language used by the deaf-mute person into audible language. Such testimony 
will be regarded as viva voce evidence for purposes of section 161 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act. Also see Du Toit (n 1) 13–5.
40 Africa (n 8) 392.
41 Psychological knowledge about an accused’s current intellectual and emotional functioning 
is therefore relevant in order to accurately determine the accused’s fitness to stand trial. See 
Africa (n 19) 3. 
42 Snyman (n 5) 132. He adds that incapacity for purposes of fitness to stand trial refers to a 
‘total incapacity’ which cannot be supplemented by, for example, an explanation by the legal 
representative of what the court proceedings entail. Ignorance of the court proceedings can 
be supplemented by an explanation of the proceedings and is therefore in itself not incapacity 
to render a person unfit to stand trial.
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The low threshold is also a concern in other jurisdictions such as the 
USA. The fitness test employed in the USA is discussed below. 
THE TEST FOR FITNESS IN THE USA
Introduction
The test for fitness to stand trial in the United States of America was 
established in 1960 in the case of Dusky v United States43 and still applies to 
this day.44 The court focussed on the fact that an accused must have a rational 
and factual understanding of the proceedings against him/her and be able 
to consult with legal representatives with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding.45 The Dusky standard is based on functional abilities and 
the impact that the mental disorder has on the accused’s competency related 
capacities.46 The test established in the Dusky case represents a minimal 
constitutional standard on competency that generally applies in all states.47 
Failure by the accused to meet any part of the test will render him/her unfit 
to stand trial.48 
Even though the test has two defined elements, as discussed in more 
detail below, a common-sense approach is still advocated.49
43 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (hereafter referred to as the ‘Dusky case’). 
Also see Jay Albanese, Criminal Justice (5 edn, Pearson 2013) 98. Also see Risdon Slate, 
Jacqueline Buffington-Vollum and Wesley Johnson, The Criminalization of Mental Illness: 
Crisis and Opportunity for the Justice System (2 edn, Carolina Academic Press 2013) 303, 
where it is confirmed that the test for fitness was established in the case even though it was 
incorporated into American law much earlier through the English common law. Also see 
Slobogin (n 4) 1006. See further Marks (n 6) 509, 510.
44 Richard Rogers and Daniel Shuman, Fundamentals of Forensic Practice: Mental Health 
and Criminal Law (Springer 2005) 151, point out that the court has not deviated from the 
standard set in this case. Also see Slovenko (n 7) 172. 
45 See in general the Dusky case (n 43). Also see Slate (n 45) 303. See further Slovenko 
(n 7) 172, who points out that the requirement that the accused must be able to put forward 
a rational defence stems from the 17th century. See further John Parry, Criminal Mental 
Health and Disability Law, Evidence and Testimony (American Bar Association 2009) 91. 
Slovenko (n 7) 173. He stresses that the court must acquaint itself with the mental condition 
of the accused and not merely establish that the accused is orientated to time and place. 
Slovenko labels the two requirements for purposes of fitness, as per the fitness test set out in 
Dusky, as the communicative and cognitive ability of the accused.
46 See Rogers (n 44) 155, 161, 162, where different models are discussed that can be used by 
forensic mental health professionals to operationalise the Dusky test. The discrete abilities 
model that divides the Dusky standard into three separate but related prongs seems preferable. 
47 Slovenko (n 7) 172. Also see Parry (n 45) 98. See further Slobogin (n 4) 1006.
48 Rogers (n 44) 152.
49 Slovenko (n 7) 181. The initial goal of the test for triability in the USA was to identify only 
those with serious cases of mental illnesses and to excuse only those from trial. Slovenko 
(n 7) 181. The opinion of a mental health practitioner was not required, and a common sense 
approach was used instead. 
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Factual and Rational Understanding of the Proceedings
This part of the test, as laid down in the Dusky case, examines the extent to 
which the accused has a factual and rational understanding of the proceedings, 
including the charges against him/her.50 The factual understanding 
requirement refers to the accused’s basic knowledge of proceedings and 
the various role players in the courts.51 The accused has to understand the 
circumstances of the trial and the consequences of a possible conviction.52 
Factual understanding alone is insufficient and must be supplemented by 
rational understanding.53 The assessment of a rational understanding of the 
proceedings centres on whether the accused has ‘reality-based’ perceptions 
about the legal system and whether he/she can make decisions based on 
reality.54
The Dusky standard for a lack of rational understanding requires a 
serious impairment of cognitive abilities due to mental disorder for an 
individual to be considered unfit to stand trial.55 Put differently, the 
level of understanding of the proceedings required, to be found fit to 
stand trial, is not very high.56 
50 Slobogin (n 4) 1006, 1008, where it is explained that the accused’s understanding of the 
charges against him/her forms part of the assessment of the accused’s ability to function 
within the criminal process. Also see Rogers (n 44) at 154. 
51 Also see Rogers (n 44) at 163, where it is indicated that the accused’s lack of understanding 
regarding the role of the judge or defence counsel, or the charges against him/her, will indicate 
a lack of factual understanding of the proceedings. An unawareness of the seriousness of 
the charges against him/her and the possible penalties will also be an indication of lack of 
factual knowledge of the proceedings. See Slobogin (n 4) 1007, where it is pointed out that 
an accused’s refusal to be informed of the functions of the role players in order to gain an 
understanding thereof is not sufficient for a finding of unfitness.
52 Rogers (n 44) 154.
53 Slobogin (n 4) 1007. Also see SE Shea, ‘Representing Clients with Mental Disabilities’ 
(2013) Public Defence Backup Centre Report 8 at 9. The court emphasised in the Dusky 
case that, when determining if an accused is fit to stand trial or not, it is insufficient to ask 
if the accused is orientated as to time and place, and if he/she at least has some recollection 
of events. The court stated at 788 that the test rather seeks to determine ‘whether he has 
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding – and whether he has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him.’ 
54 See Rogers (n 44) 154, 164, where it is indicated that the lack of awareness of the accused’s 
involvement in the proceedings is an indication that the accused lacks rational understanding 
of the proceedings. This might be evident if the accused denies the possibility of being found 
guilty or if the accused appears uninterested in the verdict and its possible impact. 
55 Rogers (n 44) 155. Also see Slobogin (n 4) 935, 1007, where other competency tests are 
discussed and where it is pointed out that most of them focus on the cognitive ability of the 
decision-maker. 
56 Slobogin (n 4) 1007, points out that the accused need not understand everything perfectly in 
order to be fit to stand trial. The threshold to be found fit to stand trial, however, is not very 
high. 
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Ability to Consult with Counsel
This part of the test focuses on the accused’s ability to rationally consult with 
counsel.57 The basic capacity of the accused to communicate coherently is 
under investigation here.58 The accused must be able to identify tangible 
evidence and provide information about viable defences such as an alibi.59 
This prong of the test does not require a certain ideal level of intellectual 
capacity, but only a reasonable degree of rational understanding.60 A higher 
level of rational understanding is required, however, when the alleged 
offence is more complex (such as securities fraud), as opposed to a less 
complex crime (such as assault).61 
The focus with this part of the test falls on the capacity to consult, rather 
than the choice to consult, since an accused can delay his trial by refusing 
to co-operate with a lawyer, regardless of his capacity to do so.62 For this 
reason, courts are hesitant to find that an accused is unfit to stand trial 
merely because of disruptive courtroom behaviour.63
It was argued that a higher degree of fitness is required when an accused 
intends to represent himself/herself, which implies that the accused is 
waiving the right to legal representation.64 It was, however, held that the 
constitutional standard of fitness as set out in the Dusky case applies 
regardless of whether an accused intends to represent himself/herself or 
57 Rogers (n 44) 152, 153. Also see this source at 178, where it is pointed out that this part of the 
test is particularly challenging for forensic mental health practitioners, because they never get 
the opportunity to observe the interaction between the accused and the legal representative. 
Also see Slobogin (n 4) 1006, who is of the view that this part of the tests assesses the 
accused’s ability to function within the criminal process, consulting with counsel is only part 
of such assessment.
58 Rogers (n 44) 164. This question investigates the accused’s ability to communicate 
understandably, whether he functions as an autonomous person motivated by self-interest, and 
whether the accused has a ‘reality-based working relationship’ with his legal representative. 
59 Slobogin (n 4) at 1009, where it is stated that the accused must, for instance, be able to 
explain their side of the story to their legal representative. The accused must be able to, for 
example, assist his/her lawyer in handling the case through considering settlement options. 
Also see Rogers (n 44) 153. Also see this source at 163, where the prototypical items that 
would indicate an inability to consult with counsel are discussed. These include inability to 
convey one’s thoughts coherently, incapacity to make decisions, and irrational perceptions 
about the case or defence counsel. These inabilities could be caused by an array of reasons, 
inter alia, thought disorders and psychosis. 
60 Rogers (n 44) 153.
61 Slobogin (n 4) 1007. Also see Rogers (n 44) 153. 
62 Rogers (n 44) 153. Also see Slobogin (n 4) 1007, where it is explained that the choice not 
to consult a legal representative is a rational choice and unless such choice is influenced by 
irrational thoughts, such refusal does not stand as a reason for a finding of unfitness.
63 Marks (n 6) 516. See further Rogers (n 44) 153. Also see United States v Holmes (1987). 
64 Parry (n 45) at 91 where reference is made to circuit court decisions where the constitutional 
standard for fitness was interpreted in a way that supports a higher degree of fitness 
requirement where accused persons intend to represent themselves. See also Slobogin (n 4) 
1034, where case law is discussed that supports the view that the standard is the same for 
fitness as for competency to take the decision to waive the right to counsel or to plead guilty. 
See in general the case of Godinez v Moran 509 U. S 389 (1993). 
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not.65 States are, however, free to impose additional due process standards 
to protect the rights of such an accused.66
Comments on the Fitness Test Employed in the USA
The legal standard for fitness in the USA is regarded as clear, consistent and 
uniform, which in turn gives professionals conducting these assessments 
certainty regarding exactly what it is that should be measured for purposes 
of fitness.67 Slovenko68 opines that the minimum standard for fitness, as set 
out by the Dusky case, allows the judge to exercise discretion in each case, 
guided by the particular circumstances of each mentally ill accused.
The rationality of the accused features prominently in the test for fitness 
in the USA. The focus of the investigation into fitness in the USA falls on 
the impact of the mental illness on the accused’s ability to act rationally, 
both in terms of the individual’s understanding of the proceedings and in 
terms of instructing legal representatives. 
An accused has to be severely affected by mental illness or intellectual 
disability to be found unfit to stand trial. The required fitness standard in the 
USA is not very high. As a result, the majority of those sent for fitness 
assessments in the United States of America are found fit to stand trial.
SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION VERSUS POSITION IN THE USA
The fitness test in South Africa and the USA are comprised of two similar 
elements namely: the ability to follow the court proceedings; and the ability 
to conduct a proper defence. Notwithstanding these two specific elements 
of the fitness test, both jurisdictions promote a common-sense approach to 
the question of fitness to stand trial. 
A relatively low level of functioning is required to be found fit to stand 
trial in both South Africa and the USA. However, it appears that the 
threshold for fitness is indeed higher in the USA than in South Africa, since 
the test for fitness employed in the USA requires a rational understanding 
65 See Parry (n 45) 91. Also see Roger (n 44) 160, 161, where the Godinez case (n 64) is 
discussed, and where the argument was raised that a higher standard of competency is 
required to plead guilty or to waive counsel than for fitness to stand trial. This argument was 
ultimately rejected by the court, although the court acknowledged that there are differences 
in the assessments for these various types of competencies. Also see Slobogin (n 4) 1056, 
1057.
66 Parry (n 45) 91. Resultantly, differences apply across a jurisdiction with regard to the due 
process that are to be followed when establishing fitness to stand trial on the one hand, and 
fitness to waive legal representation or to plead guilty on the other. See this source at 95–97 
for a discussion of the position in the various states within the USA.
67 Rogers (n 44) 151.
68 Slovenko (n 7) 172, opines that the test is actually vague but also points out the benefit of the 
practice, as stated above. Some states, such as New Jersey and Florida, refined the meaning 
of competency for purposes of fitness hearings in their particular state, but such refined 
meaning or definition of competency is still subject to and in line with the Constitutional 
principle of competency laid down in the Dusky case.
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of the proceedings. In simple terms, a factual understanding alone does not 
suffice. By comparison, no particular requirement for a rational 
understanding of the proceedings is prescribed in the South African test for 
fitness. It could be argued that such a rational understanding is implied, but 
not solidified, into South African law through legislation or case law 
specifically. 
The test for fitness in the USA further requires the accused to be able to 
consult with his/her legal representative rationally and provide information 
on a viable defence. No such requirement of rationality is stipulated within 
the South African test for fitness. In fact, the literature emphasizes the fact 
that an accused shall not be deemed unfit if he has a bizarre defence to the 
charges against him/her. 
Where an accused chooses to represent himself, the same level of fitness 
is required from such an accused as from an accused who is represented by 
a legal representative. This is the case in both jurisdictions. This is 
undesirable since self-representation involves the waiver of the right to 
legal representation. Ideally, a higher level of fitness should be required 
from accused persons who chose to represent themselves, alternatively, 
additional measures should be put in place to ensure that a self-represented 
accused is indeed fit to stand trial. Neither jurisdiction requires a higher 
level of fitness, nor did they implement additional measures to ensure that 
the self-represented accused is indeed fit to stand trial. The states in the 
USA do, however, have the option to impose additional due process 
standards to protect the rights of self-represented accused persons. No such 
discretion appears to exist in South Africa.
The fitness tests discussed above seem to be designed to identify those 
who are ‘seriously unfit’ to stand trial. By ‘seriously unfit’ is not meant 
those with serious mental illness, but rather those whose mental illness, 
regardless of the severity thereof, has a serious and definite impact on his/
her ability to follow the proceedings and/or instruct his/her legal 
representative. The threshold for fitness is therefore relatively low. 
Consequences of such low threshold are explored below.
CONSEQUENCE OF A LOW-THRESHOLD FITNESS TEST
The consequence of a low threshold fitness test, as employed in South Africa 
and the USA, is that the majority of persons sent for fitness assessments 
meet the very low requirements for fitness – in respect of the two identified 
elements discussed above – and are resultantly found fit to stand trial.
It is important to note, however, that a finding of fitness (in either of 
these jurisdictions), is not tantamount to finding that the accused does not 
suffer from a mental illness at all. On the other hand, the diagnosis of a 
mental illness will inevitably be present where an accused is found unfit to 
stand trial. However, the diagnosis of mental illness alone may not 
necessarily result in the accused being classified an unfit, as the impact of 
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the condition on the accused’s triability needs to be considered. For example, 
an accused suffering from a serious mental illness may very well be found 
fit to stand trial as long as it is clear that his mental illness does not impact 
on his functioning in as far as it pertains to his ability to follow the 
proceedings and instruct his/her legal representative. As a result, accused 
persons with serious mental illness are often found fit to stand trial.
Although the tests succeed in identifying those who are seriously unfit to 
stand trial, the large number of persons with mental illnesses that are 
eventually found fit to stand trial raises concerns. These ‘fit’ accused 
persons are often kept in prison awaiting their trial and may require mental 
health services during this time. Unfortunately, mental health services are 
not readily available in prison, especially in South Africa.69 As a result, the 
mental health condition/s of these accused persons are likely to deteriorate 
while they are incarcerated.70 Presently, a fit but mentally ill accused 
persons’ exposure to the correctional setting is not limited to their time in 
prison after a finding of fitness while awaiting trial. Accused persons who 
have to undergo a fitness assessment, are also kept in prison awaiting the 
fitness assessment. Such accused persons spend prolonged periods in prison 
awaiting the availability of a bed in a psychiatric facility licenced to conduct 
the fitness assessment. In South Africa, this period ranges between three 
and fourteen months.71 The long waiting period can be attributed to the fact 
that there are only 10 facilities across South Africa that are licenced to 
conduct court-ordered forensic assessments.72 As indicated, the mental 
health services that are available in prison to those awaiting available beds 
in a psychiatric facility (for purposes of assessment), is scarce. These 
circumstances often lead to the deterioration of the accused’s overall mental 
health.73
One could argue that the threshold for fitness could simply be raised to 
reduce the number of persons with mental illness currently found fit to 
stand trial. Concerns have been raised in other jurisdictions that a very high 
threshold for fitness will have a negative impact on the principle of 
fundamental justice in terms whereof an accused has a right to have his trial 
69 The inadequacies of mental health care services in prisons are pointed out by the Constitutional 
Court in De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2015 (2) SACR 217 
(CC) at 43. This fact was accepted by the Minister of Health in the court a quo.
70 Andrea Odegaard, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The Impact of Mental Health Courts on the 
Criminal Justice System’ 2007 (83) North Dakota Law Review 225 at 234, who points out 
that the mental condition of the accused often deteriorates during incarceration. Also see 
Governsmith (n 4) 149.
71 In one instance, a man has been waiting for transfer to the Valkenberg hospital for an 
assessment for 14 months. Bateman 2005 SAMJ 208 at 2010.
72 Pillay (n 9) 51. This number was as at 2012.
73 The inadequate mental healthcare services in prisons are pointed out by the Constitutional 
court in De Vos v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development (n 69) 43. A fact that 
was accepted by the Minister of Health in the court a quo.
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finalised without undue delay.74 This concern is raised as an accused that is 
sent for assessment inevitably spend more time in the criminal justice 
system (before trial at least) than an accused who need not be so assessed. 
Linked to the concern of undue delays due to fitness assessments, is the 
fact that a finding of unfitness suspends the criminal proceedings against an 
accused and may only continue once he/she regains acceptable levels of 
fitness as determined by the relevant fitness test in the particular jurisdiction. 
Potentially long periods could lapse before the trial continues, resulting in 
substantial delays in the criminal proceedings. 
The increased number of persons that could be found unfit to stand trial 
by employing a higher threshold, will put further pressure on the mental 
healthcare system to provide care for all those found unfit to stand trial.75
Since a higher threshold for fitness does not seem to be the ideal solution 
to reduce the number of persons with mental illnesses found fit to stand 
trial, alternatives to traditional prosecution should be considered for accused 
persons who are mentally ill but deemed fit to stand trial. Their exposure to 
the criminal justice system should be limited where possible.
THERAPEUTIC RESPONSE TO ACCUSED PERSONS WHO ARE FIT TO 
STAND TRIAL BUT MENTALLY ILL
In response to the unique challenges that mental illness brings to the criminal 
justice system, the USA, amongst other jurisdictions, introduced mental 
health courts into their criminal justice system as a therapeutic response to 
the fit but mentally ill accused. Mental health courts provide an alternative 
to traditional prosecution in the form of diversion for those found fit to 
stand trial but who are mentally ill. These accused persons are diverted 
away from the criminal justice system into appropriate treatment programs. 
74 This concern was raised by Canadian courts as highlighted by Stephen Coughlan, Criminal 
Procedure (Irwin Law 2012) 293. See Richard Schneider, Hy Bloom and Mark Heerema, 
Mental Health Courts – Decriminalizing the Mentally Ill (Irwin Law 2007) 144. Also see 
Joan Barrett and Riun Shandler, Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law (Carswell 2006) 
3–8, where it is pointed out that a delay in processing the case of the accused also translates 
in delayed justice for the victim of the crime. Also see Richard Schneider, Annotated Ontario 
Mental Health Statutes (4 edn, Irwin Law 2007) 438, where it is pointed out that autonomy 
of the accused in the criminal justice system implies an ability to choose the defence that 
he/she wants to put forward and that the accused should be allowed to do so. The accused 
should then also assume the risks involved in such a decision including the delays that will 
be brought about if the fitness issue is raised. It should be pointed out that this argument is 
more applicable to the scenario where the accused raises the insanity defence, and not so 
much where the issue of fitness to stand trial is raised. This is true, since the fitness issue can 
be raised by any party and where the prosecution raises the issue. In this instance, there is 
little that the accused can do about the situation and has to wait for the result of the fitness 
assessment. The accused has a wider range of choice when it comes to the defence that 
he/she wants to present when he/she is found fit to stand trial. It should also be noted that 
unfitness to stand trial is not a defence per se, as a trial will not follow if the accused is indeed 
found not fit to stand trial. 
75 Barrett (n 74) 3–8.
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Such diversion thus limits the exposure of an accused with a mental illness 
to the criminal justice system.
Diversion programmes, such as the mental health courts employed in the 
USA assist in reducing case backlogs in criminal courts and alleviating 
overcrowding in prisons.76 These courts have further proved to reduce 
recidivism amongst the fit but mentally ill accused.77
A similar solution should be considered for South Africa where diversion 
programs for accused persons with mental illness are currently lacking. 
Case backlogs are rife and prison overcrowding has reached concerning 
levels in South Africa.78 These are both issues that were successfully 
addressed by introducing mental health courts in the USA. These courts 
76 William Burnham Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States (5 edn, 
West 2006) 282. Also see Albanese (n 43) 254. Some diversion programmes have been very 
successful and have reported a decrease in the number of arrests following the completion 
thereof. See further Steven Lamberti and Robert Weisman, ‘Persons with Severe Mental 
Disorders in the Criminal Justice System: Challenges and Opportunities’ (2004) 75 
Psychiatric Quarterly 151–164 at 151, 161.
77 Research indicates that Mental Health Court participants are less likely to re-offend after 
completion of the Mental Health Court programme than those whose cases were processed 
through the traditional criminal justice process. Kelly Frailing, ‘Issues Affecting Outcomes 
for Mental Health Court Participants’ (2009) C.S.L.R 145–157 at 149. Also see Annette 
Christy, Nornam Poythress, Roger Boothroyd, John Petrila and Shabnam Mehra, ‘Evaluating 
the Efficiency and Community Safety Goals of the Broward County Mental Health Court’ 
(2005) 23 Behav. Sci Law 227–243 at 242, and in general Eric Trupin and Henry Richards, 
‘Seattle’s Mental Health Courts: Early Indicators of Effectiveness’ (2003) 26 International 
Journal of Law and Psychiatry 33–53. Also see Celia Fisher, ‘Towards a New Understanding 
of Mental Health Courts’ (2015) 54 The Judge’s Journal 8–13 at 10. See further Kelly 
O’Keefe, The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation: Planning, Implementation, 
Courtroom Dynamics, and Participant Outcomes (Centre for Court Innovation 2006) 3. 
Also see Shelli Rossman, Janeen Willison, Kamala Mallik-Kane, KiDeuk Kim, Sara Debus-
Sherrill and Mitchell Downey, Criminal Justice Interventions for Offenders with Mental 
Illness: Evaluation of Mental Health Courts in Bronx and Brooklyn, New York (USA National 
Institute of Justice 2012) 18, where it is further explained that those who went through 
the Mental Health Court programme and who do offend again, take longer to re-offend 
than those who did not go through the programme. Also see Arthur Lurigio and Jessica 
Snowden, ‘Putting Therapeutic Jurisprudence into Practice: The Growth, Operations, and 
Effectiveness of Mental Health Courts’ (2009) 2 The Justice System Journal 196–218 at 208, 
where it is confirmed that most Mental Health Court participants recidivate less. However, 
in another study, conducted by the Broward County Mental Health Court, it was found that 
the recidivism rate amongst Mental Health Court participants and those whose cases were 
processed through the traditional criminal court, were the same. See further Odegaard (n 70) 
251, where it is highlighted that research indicates that those participating in Mental Health 
Court programmes recidivate less. Reference is particularly made to the Broward County 
Mental Health Court. More recent research confirms that recidivism is indeed reduced 
through involvement with a Mental Health Court. 
78 In 2012 there were 152 981 prisoners in South African prisons. In 2013 this number grew 
slightly to 155  708. The specific figures of overcrowding per province are set out in 
Department of Correctional Services <http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/landing/White%20
Paper%20on%20Remand%20Detention%20Management%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf> 
accessed 22 November 2017 at 53. For more detail on the figures of overcrowding in South 
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offer a solution to at least some of the challenges that mental illness brings 
to the criminal justice system. 
CONCLUSION 
The fitness tests employed in South Africa and the USA focus on the 
same two main elements of functioning, namely, the ability to follow the 
proceedings and to instruct one’s legal representative. Even though these two 
elements are measured specifically, a common-sense approach is promoted 
in both jurisdictions. While the threshold for fitness in both jurisdictions 
is relatively low, the test employed in the USA places more emphasis on 
rational understanding. This express requirement is lacking in the South 
African test for fitness. 
The same level of fitness is required from an accused who is representing 
him/herself than from an accused who is represented by a legal representative. 
Since self-representation implies the waiver of the right to legal 
representation, which arguably leaves the accused person more vulnerable 
in the legal process, the fitness of the self-representing accused should be 
established beyond a doubt. It is submitted that a higher level of functioning 
should be required for accused persons representing themselves, 
alternatively, that additional measures should be put in place to ensure that 
such self-representing accused persons are undoubtedly fit to stand trial. 
The use of these low threshold fitness tests leads to the majority of 
accused persons assessed for fitness being found fit to stand trial, among 
who are those with serious mental illness. Raising the threshold for fitness 
to stand trial does not appear to be an ideal solution to lower the number 
of accused persons with mental illness being found fit to stand trial. It is 
strongly suggested that an alternative to traditional prosecution should be 
considered for these accused persons. To this end, South Africa should 
consider introducing mental health courts into the criminal justice system. 
This will channel fit but mentally ill accused persons away from the criminal 
justice system into appropriate treatment programs, reducing overcrowding 
in prisons and lowering criminal caseloads in the process. More research is 
needed on the viability of these specialised courts in South Africa and the 
procedure that would best serve the objectives of such courts.
 African prisons, see Department of Correctional Services <http://www.dcs.gov.za/docs/ 
landing/Discussion%20Document%20preceding%20Draft%20White%20Paper%20on%20
Remand%20Detention_1.pdf> accessed 17 November 2017 at 16 where the number of 
prisoners in 2009 is indicated as 163 892. 
      
